We offer a new explanation for the long-run underperformance of IPO stocks using prospect theory. According to this theory, uncertain outcomes enter an investor's utility function through a nonlinear transformation of their probabilities. Small probability events are given more weight than in expected utility theory, whereas median and large probability events are given less weight. IPO stocks have more extreme positive returns; hence they are valued more in prospect theory than in expected utility theory. We test our theory with Ritter's (1991) IPO sample. Using parameter values consistent with previous experimental studies, we find investors value IPOs the same as seasoned stocks in a prospective utility setting, even though the formers' long-run average returns are much lower than the latters'.
Introduction
The long-run underperformance of IPOs in both U.S. and international stock markets is a puzzle that has been extensively studied. The seminal work of Ritter (1991) reports that the average holding period return for a sample of 1526 U.S. IPOs between 1975 and 1984 underperformed control firms of similar size and industry by nearly 29% after three years. Loughran and Ritter (1995) reported that from 1970 to 1990 the companies going public produced an average return of just 5% for the next five years, whereas a control group of nonissuing firms produced an average return of 12%. Controlling for risk using the CAPM or Fama and French's three-factor model cannot eliminate the underperformance either. Although the magnitude of long-run abnormal performance is sensitive to the sample period and performance measure used, the long-run underperformance of the IPOs seems to be a consensus of the researchers. See Ritter and Welch (2002) for a recent discussion.
The long-run underperformance of IPOs is not restricted to U.S. markets. For example, Lee et al. (1996) found IPOs in Australian markets from 1976 -1989 underperformed a control group by 51% in three years. Ljungqvist (1997) found that IPOs in German markets from 1970-1990 underperformed a control group by 12% in 3-years. Cai and Wei (1997) found Japanese IPOs underperformed by 26% in three years from 1971 -1990 . The reader is referred to Table 2 There are three explanations for this curious phenomenon. Miller (1977) assumes that there are constraints on shorting IPOs, and that the investors have heterogeneous expectations on the value of the firm. The most opti-mistic investors buy the IPO, and their valuation determines the first trading day's price. As the divergence in opinion about the firm's value becomes smaller, the valuation of the most optimistic investors and hence the trading price will be lowered, resulting in long-run underperformance.
Another line of explanations argues that there are fads in the IPO market (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Shiller, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) .
During these periods investors become overly optimistic about the firm's value, and push the price higher than the fair value. Issuers are able to take advantage of these "windows of opportunity" to sell the stocks at a higher price.
The third explanation is "window dressing," which postulates that firms manipulate their accounting numbers to make the firms look better before public offering; thus beguiled investors will pay a higher price than the fair one. In the long-run investors learn the true value of the firm and the stock price will fall back. Important works on this topic include Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998). On the other hand, Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that substantial measurement errors are associated with the approach used in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) .
Numerous empirical studies have tested these explanations. The results from the empirical studies are mixed. See Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) and Ritter and Welch (2002) for recent surveys. More importantly, many researchers feel these explanations are unsatisfactory, because they require certain kinds of irrationality of investors. For example, the investors in the window dressing explanations are consistently fooled by the company's managers. As Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) put it, all these behavior explanations have to face the crucial question: why don't investors learn?
In this paper we propose a new explanation for the persistent IPO underperformance based on prospect theory. According to prospect theory, the probabilities of uncertain outcomes do not enter directly into the valuation function of investors as the standard expected utility theory assumes.
Instead the probabilities are first transformed in a nonlinear fashion, and then enter the valuation function. More specifically, investors overweight the small-probability outcomes and underweight the intermediate and high probability outcomes. Compared to seasoned stocks, IPOs are more likely to have extremely high returns. According to prospect theory, the small probability outcomes of achieving extremely high returns are valued more than in the standard expected utility setting, so even though the long-run average return of IPOs is lower than that of matched stocks, investors can still be willing to invest in IPOs because they are compensated by the prospect of gaining more extreme positive returns.
Though departing from expected utility theory, our explanation of the IPO underperformance is a rational one. In our explanation, investors correctly perceive the long-run return distribution of both IPOs and seasoned stocks and base their valuations on these distributions. The key point is that the long-run return distributions of IPOs and seasoned stocks are different.
So even if the IPOs have lower average returns, investors can still value them equally as seasoned stocks in the prospect theory setting.
We test our theory using the IPO data freely available from Professor Jay Ritter's Website and find strong evidence supporting it. We investigate the IPO underperformance by examining whether an investor who invests in an IPO will suffer utility loss compared to investing in a seasoned stock with similar characteristics. There have been extensive experimental studies on the shape and parameter values of the utility functions in the prospect theory. We find that reasonable parameter values for the prospective utility function, similar to those found in experiments, can make the investor indifferent between investing in the IPOs and investing in seasoned stocks. This means that in the framework of prospect theory, IPOs do not have long-term underperformance.
The key observation in our explanation of the IPO underperformance anomaly is that returns of IPO stocks are more skewed than those of seasoned stocks. Our approach is to examine whether investing in IPOs suffers utility loss. An alternative approach is to use asset pricing models that take into account skewness risk, such as those proposed by Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Dittmar (2002) , to examine the risk-adjusted returns. But to adjust risk using these models, we have to estimate the factor sensitivity of the IPO Our work is related to that of Loughran and Ritter (2002) . Loughran and Ritter use prospect theory to explain why IPO issuers leave money on the table. We use prospect theory to explain why investors buy IPO stocks when they know the IPO returns are lower on average. Loughran and Ritter note that prospect theory incorporates framing: if two related events occur, an individual has a choice of treating them as separate events (segregation) or as one (integration). They argue that if an entrepreneur receives the good news that he or she is suddenly and unexpectedly wealthy because of a higher than expected IPO price, the entrepreneur does not bargain as hard for an even higher IPO price. This is because the entrepreneur ingegrates the good news of becoming richer than expected with the bad news of money left on the table because of underpricing. Underwriters take advantage of this mental accounting and severely underprice these deals. The result is that most of the money left on the table comes from a minority of IPOs, those for which the offer price is revised upward from what had been anticipated.
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly describes prospect theory. Section 3 describes our method and data. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Rank dependent expected utility function and cumulative prospect theory
Prospect theory was prosposed by Kaheman and Tversky (1979) , who introduced the concepts of loss aversion and nonlinear probability weighting function. Quiggin's (1982) rank dependent expect utility (RDEU) modified the prospect theory by applying probability weighting functions to cumulative probability distribution instead of probability densities. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) integrated RDEU and loss aversion into cumulative prospect theory (CPT). All these theories have a nonlinear transformation of probabilities: p → w(p). The utility depends not on the original probability p but rather on the transformed probability w(p). The use of the distorted probabilities does not mean the economic agent is irrational. "Rather, the distortion of probability reflects the underlying psychophysics of risk" (Gonzalez and Wu, 1999). The purpose of this probability transformation is to explain several key violations of expected utility theory, including the famous Allais' parodox, which observes that the more risky of two simple uncertain lotteries becomes relatively more attractive when the probabilities of winning are reduced by equal proportion in both lotteries.
A discrete prospect (i.e., gamble, lottery, etc.) X can be represented in the form:
in which x i s are ordered outcomes from the worst to the best,
is the probability of outcome x i , and p i = 1.
In RDEU and CPT, the nonlinear transformation of probabilities is applied to the cumulative probability distribution functions, not the probabilities p i 's. This guarantees that the utility function preserves (first order) stochastic dominance relations. The value of a prospect still has an expected utility form, but the expectation is taken over the transformed probability distribution:
where
Here is the intrinsic value function and is strictly increasing. Obviously, when the function G(·) is the identity function, V (X) degenerates to the expected utility form. Thus RDEU is a generalization of the standard expected utility function.
When X has a continuous distribution, the value function of X becomes (Quiggin, 1993) :
In addition to the probability re-weighting, prospect theory and CPT also differ from expected utility theory in another aspect: the value function u(·)
is not defined on the terminal wealth; rather, it is a function of changes in wealth with respect to a reference point, and u(0) = 0. Furthermore, this theory allows two different weighting functions, denoted G
gains and losses. Suppose the outcomes of the prospect are
then the utility is
where the decision weights are defined as
Note that these weights do not necessarily sum to one. Also, RDEU corresponds to the special case where the weighting function for losses is the dual of the weighting function for gains,
i.e.,
Functional forms
In the literature of prospect theory, the typical functional form assumed for the intrinsic utility function u(x) is the power function
There are four common functional forms for the probability weighting function. One is (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 )
Another one is ( We can see that the first and fourth forms are one-parameter specializations of the second and third ones. By design, these weighting functions imply that agents overweight small probability events and underweight large probability events. Figure 1 displays the typical shape of a probability weighting function.
Parameter estimates
Extensive experimental studies have aimed to estimate the parameters of the value functions of prospect theory. Table I summarizes 
Method and data
The existing IPO underperformance literature examines the question of whether the IPO stocks have significantly lower risk-adjusted returns than the seasoned stocks with similar characteristics. We take a different approach by looking at the issue from an investor's point of view. We examine whether investing in IPO stocks results in significantly lower expected (prospective) utilities than investing in seasoned stocks. The idea is that when the investor has the CPT or RDEU utility function, (s)he cares not only about the mean returns of the investment, but also about the whole return distribution, and particularly the right tail of the return distribution. (The left tail is much less important because the gross return cannot fall below zero.) This is because the investor overweights small probability events. Since empirically the IPO return distribution does have a heavier right tail, this may provide enough compensation for the investor so that (s)he is willing to invest in the IPOs even though (s)he knows the average IPO returns is lower.
Specifically, we assume the investor has the value function of the cumu-lative prospect theory. The investor is considering investing in either an IPO or the matching stock. In this situation, it is reasonable to assume that the utility function u(x) is defined on the terminal wealth, not changes in wealth with a reference point. That is, we assume the investor has the rank-dependent expected utility. We make this assumption for three reasons.
First, many of the experimental studies from which we derive the parameter estimates used in this paper also use RDEU. We have to assume the same utility form when using their parameter estimates to be consistent. Second, if we consider loss aversion, it is not clear which is a good choice of the reference point of wealth. Third, past researchers sometimes have assumed away either loss aversion or nonlinear probability weighting. For example, many of the aforementioned experimental studies have assumed away loss aversion. On the other hand, in studying the equity premium puzzle, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) consider only the effects of loss aversion and assume away nonlinear probability weighting, because they believe loss aversion is the main determinant of the large premium of stock return over bond return.
One important characteristics of our approach is that we look at the expected utility level of investing in ONE random-selected IPO (not a portfolio of IPOs) and compare it with the utility level of investing in the matching stock. The existing literature looks at the risk-adjusted expected return of a PORTFOLIO of IPOs. We believe our approach is valid and natural in our utility-based framework because, in reality, IPOs are foated to the market at different times, and each time an IPO is offered in the market, the investor need to decide whether he is investing in the IPO or some seasoned stock of similar characteristics. It is rather unrealistic to assume an investor is going to invest in a portfolio of IPOs in our utility-based framework.
Since most of the underperformance looked at the three-year holding pe-riod return, we assume the investor has a three-year investment horizon.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the investor's initial wealth to be 1.
Then the investor's prospective utility function on investing in an IPO is
where x = (1 + R i ) is the terminal wealth of the investment at the end of the third year, and the R i 's are the three-year holding period return of the ith
IPO. F (x) denotes the distribution of the terminal wealth x.
Similarly, the investor's prospective utility function on investing in the corresponding matching stock is .
• Calculate the end-of-period wealth of investing in the matched stock for three years. Denote the end-of-period wealth as y (j) .
End.
We then approximate the integrations in eqs. (1) and (2) 
Here we assume that the x 
The data
We obtain the IPO sample from Professor Jay Ritter's Website at bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/.
The original sample has 1526 IPOs from 1975-84. We find the IPO with CRSP PERMNO 14876 has no return data on the CRSP and hence delete it. Thus our sample has 1525 IPOs.
We find the matching sample following the procedure outlined in Ritter's (1991) Appendix. The matching criteria are SIC code and market capitalization. For details, please refer to Ritter (1991). , Table III ).) We can see that the return distribution of our matching firms is very similar to his.
One important point is that the IPO returns have a much heavier right tail in distribution than the return of matched stocks, as shown in the last row of Table II . Because of the probability re-weighting, in prospect theory investors value this positive skewness in return more than they do in expected utility theory. Figure 2 gives the histograms of the IPO three-year returns and the matching stocks' three-year returns. We can see that there are quite a few extreme positive returns for the IPOs, but the same is not true for the matching stocks.
Results
Following the literature on the prospect theory, we let
For ease of graphical presentation, we consider only the one-parameter probability weighting functions:
Given the utility function and a one-parameter probability weighting function, V (X) and V (Y ), the expected utility values of investing in an IPO and a matched stock now depend on only two parameters: γ, which determines the shape of power-utility funciton, and α, which determines the shape of probability weighting function. Therefore we can easily plot the two-dimensional contour curves of V (X) and V (Y ).
Given the two probability weighting functions, there are two contour plots, as shown in Figures 3 and 4 . In each figure, we let γ and α range from 0.01 to 1 in steps of 0.01. Then we plot the contour curves of log(V (X)/V (Y )). Table I , can make the investor indifferent between investing in an IPO or its matched stock. In both Figure 3 and Figure 4 , when α = 0.5 and γ = 0.6, V (X) is approximately equal to V (Y ). This says that an average investor will be willing to invest in an IPO even though he knows that on average the IPO's return will be lower than the matching seasoned stock.
Thus IPOs having lower average long-run returns is not an anomaly.
Second, the two figures look almost identical. This means our conclusion is not sensitive to changes in functional forms of the probability weighting function.
Third, in addition to the line that V (X) = V (Y ), we also plotted the two contours where log(V (X)/V (Y )) = ±0.05. Between these two contours, V (X) is within 5% of the value of V (Y ). We can see that the band between the two contours is quite wide. This means small differences in α and γ implies only small differences in the relative value of V (X) and V (Y ). Thus our conclusion that reasonable parameter values can make the IPOs equally attractive is robust to beliefs as to which parameter values are reasonable.
Fourth, the contour curves generally have positive slopes. This means the risk aversion parameter γ has an effect on the ratio V (X)/V (Y ) opposite from that of the probability re-weighting parameter α. The reason is that heavier probability re-weighting (i.e., smaller α) increases the value of the positive skewness of the IPO return distribution, whereas more risk aversion (i.e., smaller γ) puts less value on the extreme positive outcomes, because marginal utility u (x) decreases faster.
Finally, for any γ in the range of (0, 1), we can have enough probability re-weighting to make the IPO's equally attractive as the matching stocks.
This says that probability re-weighting is sufficient in our explanation of the IPO underperformance. On the other hand, when α = 1, i.e., when there is no probability re-weighting and hence we are in the standard expected utility framework, no valid risk aversion γ in the range of (0, 1) can make
. This confirms the widely known result that, in the standard expected utility setting, IPOs have long-run underperformance.
Conclusion
We proposed a new explanation to the IPO underperformance puzzle. In contrast to existing explanations, ours does not depend on investor irrationality. Our main assumption is that investors have utility functions according to prospect theory. In this theory, investors overweight small probability events. Thus, they value the positive skewness in the IPO returns more than in the standard expected utility setting, making IPOs more attractive. We find reasonable parameter values of the utility function can make an investor indifferent between investing in an IPO or its matched stock. Thus IPO underperformance is not a puzzle. (1 + r id t ) − 1] × 100%, where r id t is the daily return on stock i on day d t . Daily returns are from the CRSP database. For initial public offerings that were delisted before the three-year anniversary, the total return is calculated until the delisting date. The total return is calculated from the first CRSP-reported closing price untile the 756th trading day after that. The corresponding matching firm's total return is calculated over the same truncated return interval. If the matching firm is delisted early, a second (and possibly a third) matching firm's return is spliced onto the first matching firm. The IPO sample has 1525 IPOs from 1975-84. For comparison purposes, we also report the return distribution of Ritter's matching firms, which is copied from 
